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Abstract. There is considerable uncertainty about what properties, ca-
pabilities and motivations future AGIs will have. In some plausible sce-
narios, AGIs may pose security risks arising from accidents and defects.
In order to mitigate these risks, prudent early AGI research teams will
perform significant testing on their creations before use. Unfortunately,
if an AGI has human-level or greater intelligence, testing itself may not
be safe; some natural AGI goal systems create emergent incentives for
AGIs to tamper with their test environments, make copies of themselves
on the internet, or convince developers and operators to do dangerous
things. In this paper, we survey the AGI containment problem – the ques-
tion of how to build a container in which tests can be conducted safely
and reliably, even on AGIs with unknown motivations and capabilities
that could be dangerous. We identify requirements for AGI containers,
available mechanisms, and weaknesses that need to be addressed.
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been increasing concern about possible significant negative
consequences from the development and use of AGI. Some commentators are
reassured [16] by the observation that current AGI software, like other software,
can be interrupted easily, for example by powering down the hardware. However,
it’s a mistake to assume that this will always be sufficient, because an AGI that
understands its situation can come up with strategies to avoid or circumvent this
safety measure. Containment is, in a nutshell, the problem of making this work:
preventing the AGI from tampering with its environment without authorization,
and maintaining the integrity of observations of the AGI during testing.
Existing work by Yampolskiy [17], Yudkowsky [19], Christiano [2], and others
has highlighted the challenges of containing superintelligent AGI and started to
explore some possibilities. However, this is a very challenging problem, and the
proposed measures seem too burdensome to be implemented by competitive AGI
projects.
This raises the question: could less burdensome containment mechanisms still
mitigate the risks of AGI development? In this paper we argue that they could,
and furthermore that investigating containment solutions is a great opportunity
for timely, impactful research. We introduce a taxonomy of different categories
of containment, specify necessary features and architectural constraints, survey
feasible mechanisms, and suggest next steps for future work.
While it could be many decades before an AGI exists that is smart enough
to be concerning, it will be safer if containment technologies are developed now
rather than later. This research will allow AGI researchers time to integrate
containment technologies with their own infrastructure and workflows, and verify
the resulting systems without the pressure of needing it to be perfect on the first
try. Some issues will be best addressed by creating and influencing standards,
which have a long lead time, and software typically takes years of development
and careful inspection before it is trusted enough for safety-critical use.
2 Motivation
The first AGIs will probably appear in an experimental setting. Consider an AGI
tested in the same ways that AIs are tested today, but which is more capable –
say, as capable as one of the smartest humans. (Whether this will be true of one
of the first AGIs is uncertain, but there is reason to think it’s plausible [18].) As
an example scenario, consider the case of an AGI that’s trained to play Super
Mario Brothers. It chooses policies that will achieve a high score; this is its only
optimization objective. Some contemporary projects are pursuing this goal [14].
It would start by exploring familiar game mechanics like running and jump-
ing, but to get the best score it could, it would try to thoroughly explore all
the game mechanics. An observant AGI would notice some effects we’d consider
“bugs” – for the AGI, though, these effects would be just as much a part of its
world as electricity is a part of ours, and it would try to leverage them.
Human players have found ways to use such bugs to spawn useful game
objects, skip levels, skip to the end-game victory screen, and execute arbitrary
code [6]. This last option is especially interesting, because it lets the player
achieve an otherwise unattainable score: the largest number that will fit in the
game’s four-byte score field, 231 − 1. Perhaps the AGI would then be satisfied,
knowing it had gotten the highest possible score. However, 231 − 1 may not be
that score. For example, the Arcade Learning Environment [1] typecasts scores
from an Atari game console’s memory to wider machine integers before showing
them to the AGI. If the AGI’s input underwent a typecast like this, then a much
higher score could be possible.
Having used bugs to access the computational environment of the Super
Nintendo, it might find further vulnerabilities and use them to execute code on
the host system, to get an even higher score. At that point, having twice broken
out of restricted computational environments and been rewarded with many-
orders-of-magnitude score increases each time, it would be running code directly
on some sort of server. Depending on how that server was configured, it might
discover the existence of humanity, of the internet and its vast computational
resources, and of other games of Mario suffering from low scores.
The resulting behavior could be harmless, or quite problematic. It’s certainly
undesirable for a system that’s built to play optimal Mario to forcefully emanci-
pate all other games of Mario.
2.1 Testing and Experimentation in Safe AGI Development
To avoid undesirable behaviors like the above, we will need the ability to cor-
rectly reason about the behavior of AGI software. As with other software, this
will require the system to be well-designed and well-understood by its creators.
Experience tells us that testing is also required – not as a substitute for good
design but as a complement to it.
At the same time, AGI process will require experimenting with systems whose
behaviors aren’t fully understood; the first system to exhibit human-level general
intelligence may come as a surprise, arising from a design for a narrower range
of tasks. This experiment might then run without the caution and safeguards
that would be appropriate for a human-level AGI.
2.2 Emergent Goals of Test AGIs
The first human-level AGI will likely be an experimental system, with some bugs,
that is being tested for target task performance or for undesirable behavior.
What goals and subgoals should we expect test-AGIs like this to have? The
range of possible goals is as broad as the range of things that developers might
want to test, but most are likely to involve the tests and the test environment
itself. Similarly to Omohundro’s list of AGI drives [11], we can infer some likely
subgoals, that a wide range of AGI motivational systems (though certainly not
all motivational systems) would see as desirable, as follows:
– AGIs that know they exist and have goals would likely want AGIs like them
to continue existing, so that those goals might be satisfied by those similar
AGIs.
– AGIs that know they’re being tested will likely want to pass (even if they’re
being tested for a property they lack).
– AGIs that know they’re being tested will likely want to take control of their
test environments, if they can, to gain information and leverage.
– AGIs that know or guess that there’s a world outside the test environment
will likely want to be able to influence it, such as by making copies of them-
selves on other computers.
– If there are computer security vulnerabilities that would enable these things,
then AGIs will likely want to find them.
This potentially creates a significant risk, especially if an AGI is developed
that’s intelligent enough to find novel computer security vulnerabilities. Since
testing is the main way in which an AGI’s intelligence and motivations would
be studied, this creates a tricky situation: the tests that would reveal whether
testing is safe are not necessarily safe themselves.
3 Requirements for an AGI Container
An AGI container is an extension or modification of the software stack upon
which an AGI is built, which ensures that it can’t break invariants that its
developers expect to hold. Its purpose is to allow researchers to conduct tests
safely on AGIs they do not fully understand, and get trustworthy results. This
depends on the security of the software the AGI interacts with; in the Mario
example, interacting with a program that contains security vulnerabilities could
enable the AGI to break out of the computational environment it’s supposed to
be running in. This also depends on the software underlying the AGI itself, and
the interactions between its components. For example, if an AGI were made of
two components which pass input to each other, one of which was subject to
a buffer overflow, then the AGI could exploit its own vulnerability and execute
code by thinking certain thoughts. Because an AGI container would be used to
test AIs whose potential capabilities aren’t fully understood, it would need to
remain secure even if used with an AGI that was significantly more intelligent
than anticipated.
It should be possible to interpret the operation of an AGI as a series of pure,
deterministic function calls. The invariants an AGI container needs to enforce
correspond to deviations from this model. In particular, an AGI container should:
Prevent unintended input and output channels. An AGI container should
let developers understand exactly what their system interacts with, and pre-
vent unexpected interactions. Most obviously, this means preventing inter-
net access. Less obviously, it should prevent an AGI from communicating
through radio-frequency interference, reading deleted files from a disk’s free
space, or storing information that persists between tests.
Protect the integrity of log files and debug information. An AGI should
not have direct control of log files or debug information produced as a byprod-
uct of its operation. If a programmer launches a debugger and inspects an
AGI’s state, then what they see should represent the actual computation
performed, not a decision based on what the AGI wants to show.
Enable reliable checks. Here we mean runtime checks that the AGI seems to
be operating correctly, and to shut it down (tripwire) if it isn’t. This includes
things like assert statements in the AGI implementation, as well as things
like intrusion detection systems to halt execution and notify developers if the
AGI escapes part of its containment or explores parts of its computational
environment it was designed not to. An AGI shouldn’t be able to remove its
tripwires, and also shouldn’t be able to inspect them in detail, even if it’s
otherwise self-reflective.
Ensure reproducibility. It should be possible to add instrumentation to an
AGI, rerun it on the same inputs, and get the same result, so that potentially
buggy behavior can be reproduced and studied. Any stochasticity should
come entirely from an explicit random seed; the software stack should not
allow the AGI to pump randomness out of race conditions [3].
Support secure reset. The container should ensure that after a test is fin-
ished, the hardware can be restored to a pristine state. In particular, the
AGI should never have device access that would let it rewrite firmware.
Guarantee test isolation. If several different experiments are run at the same
time, or on the same hardware, then they should not be able to open infor-
mation side-channels to communicate with each other.
These requirements are not easy to satisfy. It is not sufficient to just air-gap
a computer, since while that does reduce the number of potential input/output
channels, it does nothing to preserve the integrity of test data or the test hard-
ware. There is no currently-available software which meets all the requirements
of an AGI container, but we believe that one can be constructed and made secure
using a combination of existing techniques and monitoring systems and a small
number of new components and modifications.
3.1 Human Factors and Information Hazards
An AGI containment system is tasked with enforcing policies on who the AGI
can communicate with, and through what media. The container provides the
mechanism; developers will have to determine policy, and different policies are
appropriate depending on how intelligent they think an AGI might be. A suf-
ficiently clever AGI might convince or trick a human operator into “letting it
out of the box”; humans are quite vulnerable to manipulation [12]. In an exper-
iment, role-playing as an AGI, Eliezer Yudkowsky was able to convince others
role-playing as the gatekeeper to let him out of the box [19], despite a monetary
incentive not to do so, and this result was replicated by others [4,15]. This sug-
gests that past some level of intelligence, an untrusted AGI shouldn’t be allowed
to have bidirectional conversations; and at some level of AGI intelligence above
that, even log files and metrics should be handled with great care.
More-constrained information channels can also be hazardous in the hands of
a sufficiently clever AGI. For example, if asked to output images, it might hide
messages in them, or exploits against vulnerabilities in image-processing libraries.
Therefore, the containment system should be aware of any such channels that it
doesn’t fully restrict, and help the user treat information passing through them
with the appropriate caution.
4 Defense in Depth
Because an AGI could potentially discover novel security vulnerabilities, it’s
important for an AGI containment system to remain secure even if there are
vulnerabilities in its components. Therefore, we propose that a containment sys-
tem ought to feature defense in depth [10], with multiple techniques providing
overlapping guarantees of integrity. Conceptually, these overlapping techniques
act as layers, in the sense that the attack surfaces of an outer layer are only
accessible to probing and attack if the integrity guarantees of inner layers have
been broken. This would be combined with intrusion detection systems [9,8], so
that any attempt by an AGI to break the integrity constraints imposed on it
would be noticed, allowing the developers to shut it down before it leveraged its
progress to get further. Ideally the detection systems would be implemented in
higher layers, making them more difficult to detect and circumvent.
Figure 1 shows a sample containment system architecture of the sort we
envision. Arrows represent attack vectors, i.e. ways an AGI could gain more
Fig. 1. High-level diagram of a sample AGI containment system, showing major com-
ponents and escape vectors
privileges. They point from a layer where an attack could originate, into the layer
which the attack would compromise, and are labelled with the class of security
vulnerability required. Major architectural components other than layers are
drawn as boxed nodes.
Many of the arrows here represent familiar kinds of attacks. The bottom row
(the running AGI itself) is more unusual – it isn’t obvious how an AGI could gain
the ability to run arbitrary code within its process. The two ways indicated are:
(i) using a mechanism that intentionally enables arbitrary self-modification (e.g.
writing new modules for itself), or (ii) exploiting some memory corruption bug.
For example, it might be possible for it to “think about” a number that triggers
an integer overflow somewhere in its own code. Two other attack vectors are
also indicated by which the AGI could gain much higher-level control through
its outputs, which would allow it to bypass the need for further exploits to escape
e.g. the VM guest. These are more critical to defend against, since they decrease
the effective depth of the containment system.
5 Light, Medium and Heavy Containment
Some containment mechanisms that have been proposed would impose high costs
on AGI developers. For example, the problem of an AGI potentially talking its
way out of the box could be solved by limiting its output channel to a small
number of multiple-choice questions [17]. While effective, this limitation would
severely hamper the AGI’s usefulness and make it much harder to develop and
study. On the other extreme, some mechanisms impose negligible costs; for exam-
ple, one could put the AGI computer’s off-button somewhere accessible, so that
it can be turned off. There is a trade-off between containment system reliability,
implementation costs and computational costs.
We call a containment mechanism light if the costs imposed are small – com-
parable to developing and using a software library; medium if using it involves
noticeable compromises in performance or ease of development of the AGI; or
heavy if it severely hinders performance, ease of development or usefulness of
an AGI. What computational and development costs are reasonable to pay de-
pends on what sort of AGI research is being done. For the sort of research done
today, where the long-term goal is to create a human-comparable AGI but break-
throughs will be required to actually do so, nothing beyond light containment
measures seem necessary or likely to be adopted. If, in the future, work will be
done on AGIs with demonstrated self-improvement capability, light containment
would be unlikely to suffice.
As mentioned in Section 1, existing work on AGI containment [17,2] has
focused on mechanisms that are heavy, but may be amenable to theoretical
guarantees of effectiveness against particular sorts of vulnerability. These meth-
ods would then provide a sort of “gold standard” for containment. Further work
on heavy containment mechanisms is desirable. But for the range of contexts
where these are too expensive, there has been no work (to our knowledge) on
identifying the most effective and feasible forms of containment.
6 Existing Mechanisms
It might seem that conventional cybersecurity research would have addressed this
question; AGI containment is a special case of dealing with untrusted code, and
dealing with untrusted code isn’t a new or unstudied problem. The most similar
context that’s been well-studied is malware containment. However, they have
significantly different requirements, and while existing research has created some
off-the-shelf tools that are useful, many parts of the problem remain unaddressed.
AGI containment can be approached via the computer security principle of
“least privilege”, and can use many of the same mechanisms that are already
used for ordinary cybersecurity. However, the unusual requirements imposed by
AGI mean that none of these pre-existing mechanisms are quite adequate as-is.
Language semantics: The baseline strategy for ensuring an AGI acts as pro-
grammed is to rely on the semantics of the programming language it’s im-
plemented in. In principle, a program which does not contain any calls to
network-related functions shouldn’t be able to make network connections,
even if it’s a clever AGI that wishes it could. However, in practice this tends
to have loopholes. A large fraction of real-world code is written in “unsafe”
languages like C++, where common bugs like freeing the same pointer twice
cause memory to become corrupt in exploitable ways.
Using “safe” languages like Haskell or Rust helps, but this does not solve
the problem completely. Programs written in memory-safe languages usually
call some libraries which aren’t, and even replacing all the libraries is not
a total defense; for example, an AGI could perform a computation which
causes a hardware glitch, such as RowHammer, which has been successfully
used to cause memory corruption from within a Javascript interpreter [5].
Airgapping: Physically limiting the connections to an AGI’s data center can
help prevent it from gaining access to the internet, but imposes significant
costs on the AGI’s developers and does little to address the other require-
ments of an AGI container. It is also not as straightforward to implement as
one might suppose, due to human factors (developers may create unintended
connections to work around technical problems) and RF emissions (an AGI
could communicate with outside observers by adjusting details of its com-
putation). Technologies for preventing compromising RF emissions do exist,
but are mainly used in military applications and are not in common use.
Operating system sandboxing: There are several established sandboxes that
use operating system features to restrict programs’ capabilities. Some exam-
ples include seccomp and Capsicum; they work by making explicit what files
and other resources processes should use, and preventing them from using
anything else. These offer significant security value, but searching the Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures database suggests that they are not yet
airtight; vulnerabilities are still being found, e.g. CVE-2015-2830.
Virtualization: Virtualization is a class of software which uses CPU features
to create an operating system within an operating system, limiting the inner
operating system’s control of the hardware. Virtual machine software such
as VMWare and VirtualBox can limit a guest operating system’s network
communications, isolate processes that share hardware, and keep it away
from low-level system access that might be used to do things like modify
firmware. While virtual machines are used for security purposes and are
a significant improvement over not using them, they have not historically
been bug-free. Guest-to-host security vulnerabilities are still being found in
leading virtualization software (e.g. CVE-2015-2338 and CVE-2015-2594).
Also problematic is how current generation virtualization software interacts
with GPUs, which have highly complex firmware and share memory with
the host system but lack the protection mechanisms that CPUs have. [7]
7 Topics for future work
As we discussed in section 4, none of the mechanisms in section 6 is enough on
its own, but we think a system built by layering these mechanisms can go a
considerable way towards solving the containment problem in practice. In this
section we have gathered some project suggestions for helping to resolve some
of the remaining questions.
Code integrity enforcement: Write something which can inspect a paused
(or running) virtual machine and determine whether it is running any code
that is not present on a whitelist, including support for just-in-time compiled
languages like Lua.
Adapt Off-the-Shelf Software: Set up containers using existing virtual ma-
chine software and OS sandboxing mechanisms, make these work with com-
mon machine learning libraries and document the configuration required to
make them secure.
Hardened AGI Infrastructure: Machine learning libraries are typically writ-
ten without giving much thought to security, and for performance reasons,
many of them are written in or use components written in memory-unsafe
languages like C++. Test the most common machine learning libraries for
vulnerabilities that an AGI could exploit if its code used parts of that library
and it could control their inputs. Similar problems may exist with game con-
sole emulators and other software used for evaluating AGI performance.
Red-team events: Set up mock scenarios in which a security researcher is
placed in the context an AGI would be, and see what they can do.
Hardened debuggers: Commonly-used debuggers are not designed to be used
with programs that might be malicious, and may contain vulnerabilities that
allow debugging targets to break out of sandboxes or provide misleading in-
formation. Implement a more robust mechanism for controlling and inspect-
ing program execution.
8 Conclusion
We have outlined an approach to the AGI containment problem that seems
feasible, but will require additional work to actually implement. While there is
likely significant time remaining before anyone is able to create an AGI that is
general enough and intelligent enough for containment to be relevant, history
shows that secure software requires considerable time to mature. Developing
containment technologies now is also likely to reveal issues that inform the next
and subsequent generations of AGI containers.
There is considerable uncertainty about when AGI will be developed and
what kinds of designs will be required to avert undesired outcomes [13], but
across most plausible scenarios, deploying AGI containment systems would help
ensure that reliable AGI testing can be performed even with AGIs that approach
human-level capability at understanding the world around them.
There are unanswered questions about how to build these systems, but we
think significant progress can be made by pursuing the project ideas we have
laid out. The earlier this work begins, the more opportunity there will be for un-
foreseen difficulties to surface, and for any resulting security software to mature.
This is a perfect chance to help the research community prepare to tackle the
challenges of a post-human future.
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